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NATIVE HAWAIIAN CULTURAL 
PRACTICES UNDER THREAT 
BY DAVID M. FORMAN AND STEPHEN M. KNIGHT* 
In 1995, the Hawai'i Supreme Court handed down its unanimous decision in Public Access Shoreline 
Hawaii v. Hawai'i Coun~ Planning Commission. I The court affumed earlier opinions by the Intermediate 
Court of Appeals and the Third Circuit Court, which dealt with basic questions of administrative pro-
cedure. The Hawai'i County Planning Commission had rejected a request by Public Access Shoreline 
Hawaii (P ASH) to hold a contested case hearing on an application for a Special Management Area 
(SMA) use permit. Developer Nansay Hawaii, Inc. (Nansay) submitted the application for permission 
to develop a resort complex in the ahupua'a2 of Kohanaiki, on the Kona coast of the Island ofHawai'i. 
PASH claimed standing to participate based, in part, on the claim that its native Hawaiian members 
traditionally gathered 'opae (shrimp) from the anchialine ponds on Nansay's property. However, the 
Planning Commission determined that PASH lacked standing because its purported interest in the 
proceeding was "not clearly distinguishable from that of the general public."3 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Hawai'i held that "PASH sufficiently demonstrated standing to 
participate in a contested case" based on: 
* 
unrefuted testimony ... that its members, as native Hawaiians who have exercised 
such rights as were customarily and traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural, and religious 
purposes on undeveloped lands, have an interest in a proceeding for the approval of a SMA per-
mit for the development oflands within the ahupua'a which ... [is] clearly distinguishable from 
that of the general public.4 
David M. Forman, Staff Attorney, Native Hawaiian Legal COIporationj law clerk for the Honorable Robert G. Klein, 
AssociateJustice of the Hawai'i Supreme Court (January 1994 through August 1996). Stephen M. Knight, a 1996 graduate 
of Hastings College of the Law, clerked for Justice Klein during 1996-97. The authors, who are solely responsible for the 
views expressed in this article, extend their thanks to Carl C. Christensen, Virginia A. Fontaine, David Kimo Frankel,Judge 
Walter M. Heen (retired), Lea O. Hong, Neil F. Hulbert, Paul F. Nahoa Lucas, Arnold L. Lum, William M. Tam and Jon 
M. Van Dyke for valuable comments and suggestions. The authors regret that the Hawaiian language could not be accom-
modated in this article. Discerning readers will observe that several Hawaiian words and names are misspelled because the 
macron, whose presence would otherwise indicate a distinctively long vowel, has been omitted by the publisher. 
I Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 79 Hawai'i 425, 903 P.2d 1246 (1995) (opinion by 
Klein,].), cen. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1559 (1996) [hereinafter Kohanaiki/PASH]. See also Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. 
Hawaii County Planning Comm'n, Civ. No. 90-293K (3d Cir. Haw.June 7, 1991) (opinion by Ibarra,].), qffd<in part and 
rev'dinpart, 79 Hawai'i 246, 900 P.2d 1313 (App. 1993) (opinion by Heen,].). 
2 An "ahupua'a" is a land division usually extending from the mountains to the sea along rational lines, such as ridges or 
other natural characteristics. 79 Hawai'i at 429 n.l, 903 P.2d at 1250 n.1 (citing In Re Boundaries of Pulehunui, 4 Haw. 
239,241 (1879)). 
3 79 Hawai'i at 429, 903 P.2d at 1250 (citing Hawai'i County Planning Commission Rule 4-2(6)(B)). Angel Pilago also 
sought a contested case hearing, claiming that the planned development would destroy important cultural sites, including 
the burial site of King Kamehameha I. The ICA reversed the Third Circuit Court with respect to Pilago and the Supreme 
Court affirmed because Pilago failed to me a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. See Uf. at 430-31,903 P.2d at 1251-52 
(declining to address Pilago's asserted rights). 
• Id. at 434, 903 P.2d 1255 (quoting 79 Hawai'i at 252, 900 P.2d at 1319) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
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The opinion relies on several sources of authority to support its conclusion that native Hawaiian prac-
titioners have a legally cognizable interest in the planning process. For example, the Coastal Zone 
Management Act (CZMA)5 requires the Planning Commission to give full consideration to cultural 
and historic values as well as to needs for economic development.6 In addition, Article XII, Section 7 
ofthe Hawai'i State Constitution (1978), irifra, and Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 1-1, irifra, oblig-
ate the Planning Commission to "protect the reasonable exercise of customary and traditional rights 
that are established by PASH on remand" to the extent feasible.? Although the Hawai'i Supreme 
Court left open the possibility that PASH's particular gathering rights claim could be challenged on 
remand to the Planning Commission,s Nansay eventually withdrew its SMA permit application.9 
This case (the Kohanaiki decision or PASH, hereinafter Kohanaikil PAS1/), has already generated 
considerable comment,10 and was the focus of controversial legislation proposed during the 1997 state 
legislative session. ll Unfortunately, commentators often have exaggerated and/or mischaracterized 
the nature of the decision in order to serve particular interests. For example, the Pacific Legal 
Foundation, an advocate for private property claims in the United States, asserts that the 
Kohanai/dl PASH decision "obliterated hundreds of years of established American property law in favor 
of a system that legitimizes trespass or 'gathering' rights by descendants of native Hawaiians on private 
property. In a single ruling, that court transformed private property into public property without com-
pensation."12 Another commentator has warned that Kohanai/dl PASH could "bring development to a 
chaotic standstill. . .. If our elected officials don't get to work on this problem very soon, outside 
investment will diminish or even dry up completely[.],,13 
Rhetoric like this may help partisan organizations raise money and spread general anxiety, but it 
does not come close to fairly representing the Hawai'i Supreme Court's decision in Kohanai/dl PASH, 
nor does it advance the goal of accommodating customary and traditional practices with sustainable 
economic development. Such rhetoric nevertheless helped spark the introduction of two similar -
5 See Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) chapter 205A (1993). 
6 79 Hawai'i at 435,903 P.2d at 1256. q: Forman, Ecorwmic Development vs. Erwironmental ProtectWn: Executive Ooersight and 
JudiciolRwiew rfWetland Politzy, 15 U. HAW. L. REV. 23, 33-34 nn. 45-47 & 42-43 nn. 91-92 (1993) (comparing federal statu-
tory provisions that incorporate various standards for balancing economic considerations with the interests for which protec-
tion is mandated under the respective statutes). 
7 /d. at 451,903 P.2d at 1272; see geTUlTal!Y, w. at 437-51,903 P.2d at 1258-72. 
8 See id. at 434-35 & 448 n.39, 903 P.2d at 1255-56 & 1269 n.39. 
9 &e Hugh Clark, Builder withdraws its Kana resort applicatWn, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, August 2, 1996, at A5 (indicating 
that Nansay stated it could revive the stalled project ifit regained its financing fromjapan). 
10 See, e.g., Steven Christensen, Po!Janna & PASH: Irrepressible optimism at court, HAWAl'I BAR JOURNAL 23 (Feb. 1996); 
Kenneth R. Kupchak, Native use rights to cifflct permits, PACIFIC BUSINESS NEWS, April 15, 1996, at 7 [hereinafter 
Kupchak, Native Use ~hts]; Daniel H. Case & Clinton R Ashford, No order in state high court, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, 
August 4, 1996, at B3; Kupchak, 'PASH" ruling could stifle investmen~ development in Hawa£i, unless lawrnt:JJcers act, HONOLULU 
ADVERTISER, September 8,1996, at Bl [hereinafter Kupchak, PASH Rul~; Roy A. Vitousek, Ruling creates ''absurd'' taJcing 
rfrights, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, September 17, 1995,at Bl; A.A Smyser, Defining traditWnal and customary rights, 
HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, December 10, 1996, at A16; Smyser, Reasonsfor concern on Hawaii's}itl:ttre, HONOLULU 
STAR-BULLETIN,january 2,1997, at A12; David Brady,Proper!Y rights now threatened, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, 
January 26, 1997, at B 1 ;johnJubinsky, Decision serWus!J flawed, HONOLULU ADVER TISER,June 22, 1997, at B3. 
II See, e.g., Senate Bill 8 (introduced by Senator Randall IWaSe); House Bill 1920 (introduced by Representative Calvin K.Y. 
Say). 
12 Pacific Legal Foundation, PROJECT HAWAII 1 Ganuary 1996), quoted in Kat Brady, ~hts rf all better protected, HONO-
LULU ADVERTISER,january 26, 1997, atB I. 
13 Kupchak, PASH Ruling, supra note 10. See also Kupchak, Native Use Rights, supra note 10 ("[S]urely this chaos must cease! 
Unified comprehensive action at the highest possible level is necessary now in order to anchor the continually mobile con-
cepts ofPASH and save our teetering economy."). 
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and similarly ill-considered - legislative proposals during the 1997 session, which sought to regulate 
the exercise of native Hawaiian practices, customs, and traditions. 14 Although Senate Bill 8 ("SB 8") 
and House Bill 1920 ("HB 1920") were not adopted in 1997, they remain alive in the 1998 legislative 
session or could appear in different form in subsequent years. 
The proposal taken up by the Senate, SB 8, provides that "private property rights in Hawaii are 
unclear as to whether landowners have clear title to undeveloped land if native Hawaiians assert tradi-
tional and customary rights on a private landowner's land." For its part, HB 1920 asserts that the 
Hawai'i Supreme Court's decisions have "created" an "uncertainty ofland titles and property rights" 
that "poses a serious threat to the State's economic and social well-being." Both bills propose burden-
some and unnecessary adversarial processes that could result in the widespread termination of tradi-
tional and customary practices - a new and even more devastating Mahele. 15 Rather than simply 
"reassuring" landowners regarding the nature of their title, the proposed legislation represents a frontal 
assault on native Hawaiian cultural practices. 
This article analyzes the proposed legislation in light of the legal and historical development of 
private property and customary practices in Hawai'i. Part A outlines relevant provisions of SB 8 and 
HB 1920 and examines their underlying rationale. Part B investigates aspects of the Kohanaikil PASH 
decision. This part summarizes applicable precedent, beginning with Kalipi v. Hawaiian T mst CO. 16 and 
Pele Difense Fund v. Pa!y,17 then addressing the significance of the nearly l40-year-old decision in Oni v. 
Meek l8 to Kohanaikil PASH. This part continues by reviewing the Kohanaikil PA~H court's explication of 
these cases and offering a critique of a contrary interpretation by a federal court in Pai 'Ohana v. United 
States. 19 With this background, the article returns in Part C to the question of appropriate legislative 
reactions, focusing on the principles of accommodation and cooperation that lie at the heart of 
Kohanaikil PASH. Finally, Part D recognizes that the nature and scope of traditional and customary 
rights deserves fuller examination. But the article suggests that the Hawai'i Supreme Court will not 
likely uphold attempts to provide certainty for fee simple landowners at the cost of widespread eradica-
tion of cultural practices. 
A. Legislative Reactions to the Kohanaikil PASH decision. 
SB 8 proposed to establish an administrative process for the registration of native Hawaiian cul-
tural practices with the State Land Use Commission (LUC), including a provision for the termination 
or modification of such rights upon petition by a landowner. HB1920 sought to establish an expedit-
ed judicial process for resolving claims of native Hawaiian rights, including similar provisions for the 
modification of, as well as further limitations on, the exercise of such rights on certain classes of land. 
Both bills interpret traditional and customary rights in a way that is more restrictive than the principles 
enunciated in the Kohanaikil PASH decision. Conversely, both bills interpret private property rights in 
14 Yuklin Aluli, Esq., has argued that the terms "custom," "tradition," and "practice" are terms of art in the Pacific that 
should be used in place of references to native Hawaiian "rights." The merits of Aluli's arguments are beyond the scope 
of this article. To the extent that the term "rights" is used here, however, the authors do not intend such use as a rejec-
tion of Aluli's developing concepts. See Hawai'i Water Law Seminar, Hawaii Institute for Continuing Legal Education 
(May 30, 1997). 
15 In 1848, the King, the chiefs, and their land agents separated out their respective interests in the land ofHawai'i. See 
J. CHINEN, THE GREAT MAHELE: HAWAII'S LAND DIVISION OF 1848, at 15-16 (1958). 
16 66 Haw. 1,656 P.2d 745 (1982). 
17 73 Haw. 578, 837 P.2d 1247 (1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1277 (1993). 
18 2 Haw. 87 (1858). 
19 875 F. Supp. 680, 691 (D. Haw. 1995), tiffd, 76 F.3d 280 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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ways thatare~oreeXpansive than is provided in the Kohanaikil PASH decision. 
SB 8'sdnttorluctory provisions suggest a more balanced approach, expressing concern over "a 
potential forcol1fl.iet between the private property rights of landowners and the traditional and cus-
tomary rightS.'of native Hawaiians[,)" and seeking to "provide private landowners with reassurance 
regarding th.e}si:attJs qf their title while preserving the rights of native Hawaiians to continue to engage in 
traditi(jnab.~aiustomary practices on undeveloped lands."20 A closer examination of some of the 
bill's provisions~ however, reveals a clear bias in favor of extinguishing traditional and customary prac-
tices. 
SB 8 envisions a process reminiscent of the Mahele. Under this bill, no customary practice legally 
may be performed in this state without the formal issuance of a certificate of registration. Any person 
seeking such a certificate must establish, "by clear preponderance of evidence, that the petitioner is a 
descendant of native Hawaiians who engaged in traditional and customary practices on the specific 
undeveloped land prior to November 25, 1892." The LUC has the right to impose conditions on the 
exercise of the practice. In applying for such a certificate, the following information, "at a minimum," 
is required: 
(I)Name and address of the petitioner, and any other lineal descendant of the petitioner who will 
accrue to the benefits conferred by the issuance of a certificate of registration of native Hawaiian 
right; 
(2)Genealogy of petitioner or other documentation conclusively establishing that the petitioner is a 
descendant of native Hawaiians who inhabited or occupied the Hawaiian islands prior to 1778; 
(3)A description of the undeveloped land or portion of the undeveloped land in which the petition-
er claims that traditional and customary practices have occurred; 
(4)The nature or description of the traditional and customary practices that petitioner desires to 
practice on the undeveloped land; and 
(5)Any documents or records that the practices have been undertaken by the petitioner or the peti-
tioner's ancestors on the undeveloped land.21 
Following receipt of a petition, the LUC is to hold a contested case hearing to decide its validity. 
Any petition must be fIled prior to the issuance of a building or grading permit on the subject land, 
otherwise "the land shall be considered developed, and shall therefore, not be subject to any claims or 
rights to native Hawaiian traditional and customary practices." The law would also allow for petitions 
to be brought by landowners for the "termination or modification" of any certificates issued by the 
commission on a showing by the landowner that the certificate "will cause hardship . . . and pose an 
unreasonable restriction on the landowner's intended use of the property." Notice of such termination 
proceedings could be made via simple publication in a newspaper of general circulation on the island 
where the practice is exercised. 
Thus, SB 8 raises the specter of probable, widespread termination of traditional and customary 
practices through artificial and inappropriately adversarial means, such as default judgments. Article 
XII, Section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution does recognize the State's power to regulate the exercise of 
traditional and customary practices, but the Supreme Court made clear in Kohanaikil PASH that this 
regulatory power "does not justifY the summary extinguishment of such rights [.J "22 
Furthermore, both bills sweep aside the Supreme Court's suggestion that, in most circumstances, 
traditional and customary practices can coexist with development. HB 1920 prohibits such practices 
20 SB 8, page I, lines 12-15 (emphasis added); see also SB 8, Senate Draft 1, page 1, lines 13-17 (indicating the purpose of 
providing landowners "with reassurances regarding ... their ability to utilize their property"). 
21 SB 8, page 5, lines 3-19. 
22 79 Hawai'i at 442,903 P.2d at 1263. 
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on any land that has been physically improved or altered. Under SB 8, the presence of, or possession 
of a permit for, a building, structure, or improvement (broadly defined as "sidewalks, pathways, paved 
trails, golf course fairways and greens, recreational playing fields, and the installation of utilities") pre-
cludes the exercise of customary rights. 23 
HB 1920 assumes that the Kohanai/cil PASH decision "has had, and will continue to have, a nega-
tive impact on all of Hawaii's citizens, including native Hawaiians." Consequently, the drafters 
deemed this bill "necessary ... for the health, safety, and welfare of Hawaii's citizens." HB 1920 
implicitly criticizes the court's decision for having "created" the uncertainty that made legislative 
action necessary. The bill points to the 1851 decision by the Supreme Court of the Kingdom of 
Hawai'i, in Kukiiahu v. GilI,24 which is purported to have upheld "the western property system created 
by the [Mahele] and the titles subsequently awarded by the Land Commission ... [so as to prevent a 
situation that would have provided] 'no security for any man's real estate - no rest for his title[.]"'25 
In point of fact, however, Kukiiahu held no such thing. 
The Kukiiahu court ruled in favor of a native tenant who held land under an 1850 Royal Patent 
that was issued pursuant to a Land Commission Award. The court held that this tenant was entitled to 
damages for trespass, notwithstanding the government's issuance of a Royal Patent grant to the defen-
dant in 1849 (which covered the same land), because the 1849 grant was made "subject to the rights of 
natives[.]"26 In other words, although the 1849 and 1850 patents involved the same property, they 
remained distinct. The court explained that, "The King did not convey Kukiiahu's rights [in 1849]. .. 
and ifhe had done so, his grant would have been a nullity."27 Thus, the very first volume of reported 
decisions in Hawai'i contains the same statement regarding the nature of land titles as the seventy-
ninth volume. No new "conflict" or "uncertainty" was created by Kohanai/cil PASH. Rather, the newly 
alleged "uncertainty" is a result of mistaken assumptions and selective readings of non-binding dicta in 
earlier judicial opinions. 
B. Property Law and CustOIll8.l')' Practices in Hawaiian History 
Kohanaikil PASH outlines the complicated history of the introduction of private property to 
Hawai'i.28 With the support of their foreign governments, European and American settlers pressed for 
change in the indigenous peoples' system of land use, leading to the establishment in 1845 of a Board 
of Land Commissioners to settle all land claims throughout the islands. The subsequent division of 
land between the king, the chiefs and the people became known as the Mahele. While "the develop-
ment of private property was deemed indispensable to the political existence of the kingdomL]" the 
people of Hawai'i made clear at the time that they were "afraid that the wise would step on the igno-
rant" as a result.29 Accordingly, this move towards European-style fee ownership was expressly quali-
fied by the fact that "all lands of the king, government and chiefs were given subject to the rights of native 
tenants."30 In other words, those who acquired "fee simple" land from the government received 1 00% -
x, where x = "the rights of native tenants." 
23 SB 8, Senate Draft 1 creates an exception for land greater than five acres in size. As to such parcels, customary prac-
tices are precluded only where buildings, structures, or improvements cover more than ten percent of the lot size. 
24 1 Haw. 90 (1851); this citation is to a reprint of the original published version, Kukiiahu v. Gill, 1 Haw. 54 (1851). 
25 H.B. 1920, page 2, lines 8-17 (citing Kukiiahu, 1 Haw. at 91). 
26 1 Haw. at 54. 
27 /d. 
28 See 79 Hawai'i at 442-47,903 P.2d at 1263-68. 
29 Id. at 444, 903 P.2d at 1265 (quotation marks omitted). 
30 Melody K. MacKenzie, Historical Background, in NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK 7 (MacKenzie, 
ed., 1991) (emphasis in original). 
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The most recognized statutory codification of this reseIVation favoring native tenants can be found 
today in HRS § 7-1. The original version of this statute was enacted in 1850 in response to the King's 
concern for the circumstances of native tenants; it has remained largely unchanged to this date:31 
BuDding materials, water, etc., landlords' tide subject to tenants' use. Where the 
landlords have obtained, or may hereafter obtain, allodial tides to their lands, the people on each 
of their lands shall not be deprived of the right to take firewood, house-timber, aho cord, thatch, 
or ki leaf, from the land on which they live, for their own private use, but they shall not have a 
right to take such articles to sell for profit. The people shall also have a right to drinking water, 
and running water, and the right of way. The springs of water, running water, and roads shall be 
free to all, on all lands granted in fee simple; provided that this shall not be applicable to wells and 
watercourses, which individuals have made for their own use. 
A second statute, HRS § 1-1, expressly retains traditional usage as part of the structural foundation of 
the law governing the Hawaiian Islands: 
The common law of England, as ascertained by English and American decisions, is declared to be 
the common law of the State of [Hawai'i] in all cases, except as otherwise expressly provided by 
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or by the laws of the State, or fixed by Hawaiian 
judicial precedent, or established by Hawaiian usage .... 32 
In 1978, the people ofHawai'i amended the State Constitution (Article XII, Section 7) to provide: 
The State reaffirms and shall protect all rights, customarily and traditionally exercised for subsis-
tence, cultural and religious purposes and possessed by ahupua'a tenants who are descendants of 
native Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778, subject to the right of the 
State to regulate such rights. 
This constitutional amendment retdJirms existing rights; it does not create any new rights nor does it 
expressly extinguish any rights. Elected delegates to the Constitutional Convention made clear at the 
time that they "did not intend to have the section narrowly construed or ignored by the Court."33 In 
fact, the delegates explained further that, "in reaffirming these rights in the Constitution, your 
Committee feels that badty neededjudicial guidance is provided and enforcement by the courts of these rights is guar-
anteed."34 Seventeen years later, in Kohanai/cil PASH, the court finally revisited the structural foundation 
of Hawai'i's statutory and common law authority, as memorialized in HRS § 1-1. Reviewing this his-
torical foundation, the court unanimously held that "legitimate customary and traditional practices 
must be protected to the extent feasible in accordance with Article XII, Section 7."35 
31 See Kohanaiki/PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 438 n.22, 903 P.2d at 1259 n.22 (observing that § 7-1 has not undergone signifi-
cant change since the Act of July 11, 1851, which amended the Act of August 6, 1850, § 7, so as to remove the require-
ment of obtaining the landowners' permission to exercise such rights). See also id. at 445 n.34, 903 P.2d at 1266 n.34 
(quoting the Act of November 7, 1846, § 1, which formerly provided limited rights of pasturage in addition to the items 
currently listed). 
32 See id. at 437 n.21, 903 P.2d at 1258 n.21 (tracing this provision to the Laws of 1892, ch. LVII, § 5, but acknowledging 
that the native usages and customs in regard to landed tenures were preserved throughout the historical development of 
the kingdom's written laws); id. at 445 n.33, 903 P.2d at 1266 n.33 (quoting the Act of April 27, 1846, pt. I, ch. VII, art. 
IV, § 7, which constrained the Land Commission's power to quiet title "in accordance with ... native usages in regard to 
landed tenures"). 
33 Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. at 619-20,837 P.2d at 1271 (quoting Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 57, reprinted in 1 
Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of Hawaii ofl978, at 640). 
34 !d. at 620, 837 P.2d at 1271 (emphasis added). 
35 Kohanaiki/PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 451,903 P.2d at 1272. 
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KohanaikilPASH drew upon two other Hawai'i Supreme Court cases decided after 1978 that 
explored the content of traditional and customary rights protected by HRS § 1-1, HRS § 7-1, and the 
Constitution of the State ofHawai'i. 
1. Ktdipi v. Ro:w.ii.n Trust Co., et .1. 
In 1982, the court decided Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., supra. The plaintiff, William Kalipi, sought 
to exercise traditional Hawaiian gathering rights in the ahupua'a of 'Ohi'a and Manawai, which 
encompass a total of approximately 1,280 acres of the island of Moloka'i. These privately owned lands 
are used primarily for raising cattle and hunting. Kalipi owned a taro patch in Manawai and an 
adjoining houselot in 'Ohi'a. He was raised on the lots and resided there periodically until 1975 but, 
at the time of trial, lived with his family in the nearby ahupua'a of Keawenui. Kalipi asserted that he 
and his family traditionally gathered ti leaf, bamboo, kukui nuts, kiawe, medicinal herbs and ferns. 
However, the defendants denied his request to provide him with a key so that he could obtain access to 
their newly fenced-in lands.36 
The Hawai'i Supreme Court held that residents of a specific ahupua'a are entitled to access unde-
veloped land for the purpose of engaging in traditionally and customarily exercised gathering prac-
tices. However, the court focused primarily on HRS § 7-1 and only tangentially on HRS § 1-1. 
Therefore, the court upheld traditional access rights but determined that Kalipi had lost his ability to 
exercise those rights when he moved out of the subject ahupua'a. Based on the evidence presented at 
trial, the court concluded that there was "an insu.fficient basis to find that such rights would, or should, 
accrue to persons who did not actually reside within the ahupua'a in which such rights are claimed."37 
2. Pele Defense Fund v. P.ty, et .1. 
In 1992, the court decided Pete Difense Fund v. Pary, supra. The State of Hawai'i had exchanged 
approximately 27,800 acres of public "ceded" lands,38 including the Wao Kele '0 Puna Natural Area 
Reserve and other Puna lands on the Island of Hawai'i, for approximately 25,800 acres of land at 
Kahauale'a owned by the Estate of James Campbell. The exchange facilitated development of geo-
thermal resources on the ceded lands. The Pele Defense Fund (PDF) claimed, inter alia, that the geo-
thermal companies operating on these lands excluded their members from the property in violation of 
Article XII, Section 7 of the State Constitution. 
At least two PDF members, who happened to be native Hawaiians of more than fifty percent 
Hawaiian blood, resided in the neighboring ahupua'a of Maku'u and Kalapana; they claimed to have 
customarily and traditionally exercised subsistence, cultural, and religious practices on the subject 
lands.39 In deciding this issue, the Hawai'i Supreme Court first distinguished Kalipi: "Because Kalipi 
based his claims entirely on land ownership, rather than on the practiced customs of native Hawaiians 
on Moloka'i, the issue facing us is somewhat different from the issue in Kalipi."40 Therefore, based on a 
proffer of evidence that residents of neighboring ahupua 'a exercised customary and traditional rights 
36 William Kalipi, Statement during public workshop held by the PASH Study Group, Mitchell Pau'ole Center, 
Kaunakakai, Moloka'i (November 13, 1997). 
'1 66 Haw. at 12,656 P.2d at 752 (emphasis added). 
,. See Hawai'i Admission Act § 5(f), Pub. L. No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4, 6 (1959) (obligating the State ofHawai'i to hold, in trust, 
lands classified as government or crown lands prior to the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1893 and subsequent-
ly "ceded" to the United States by the Republic of Hawai'i upon annexation in 1898). 
39 Id. at 620-21 & n.34, 837 P.2d at 1272 & n.34 (citing affidavits attached to the plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition 
to the defendants' pretrial motion to dismiss and for summary judgment). 
<Old. at 618-19, 837 P.2d at 1271. 
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in the subject ahupua 'a, the court reversed the lower court's order granting summary judgment in favor 
of the defendants. The Hawai'i Supreme Court held "that native Hawaiian rights protected by article 
XII, § 7 may extend beyond the ahupua'a in which a native Hawaiian resides where such rights have 
been customarily and traditionally exercised in this manner."41 These customary rights do not depend 
on land ownership, and the transfer of ownership of land on which such rights were exercised in no 
way extinguishes the right of access.42 
3.Oni v. Meek. 
120 years prior to the adoption of Article XII, Section 7 in 1978, the Supreme Court of the 
Kingdom of Hawai'i decided another case involving a claim of customary and traditional rights. The 
plaintiff, Oni, was a native tenant of the ahupua'a of Honouliuli who sought to recover the value of two 
horses sold as strays by the defendant, Meek. Meek claimed that the horses were seized for trespass on 
lands he held under lease from the konohiki of the land, Haalelea. Three separate leases between 
Haalelea and Meek covered the kula lands of Honouliuli, the 'ili of Lihu'e, and the 'ili of Waimanalo. 
Oni claimed a right, based on contract, custom and/or statute, to pasture horses at Honouliuli. First, 
Oni argued that the Honouliuli lease reserved his rights under contract as a "kanaka e noho ana rna 
lalo 0 ka malu 0 ka aoao mua" - i.e., his rights as one of the "people living under the shade of the 
party of the first part (the konohiki [Haalelea])."43 The court rejected this argument based on the 
absence of any evidence that Oni's horses were seized on the lands covered by this lease.44 
Alternatively, the court opined that the reservation was meaningless because whatever rights Oni held 
in the land were already protected by law and Haalelea did not have the power to alienate Oni's 
rights.45 
Secondly, Oni claimed a customary right to pasture his horses at Honouliuli. The court observed 
that horses were not even introduced to the ahupua'a until 1833 and that, around 1851, many native 
tenants in the area offered to continue performing labor for Haalelea in exchange for the right to con-
tinue pasturing horses on the konohiki's land in Honouliuli.46 Meek countered that a custom is not 
proved until it is shown to i) have existed from time immemorial, ii) be reasonable, iii) be certain, and 
iv) be not inconsistent with the laws of the land.41 The court expressly declined to adopt the first 
requirement proposed by Meek, but concluded that "the custom contendedfor is so unreasonable, so uncer-
tain, and so repugnant to the spirit of the present laws, that it ought not to be sustained by judicial 
authority."48 In other words, the claim of pasturage was not supported by historical evidence to support 
its purported status as a traditional and customary right in the ahupua'a ofHonouliuli. This interpreta-
tion is consistent with the observation of Associate Justice John I'i in the official minutes of this proceed-
ing that, "[s]ince the granting of the allodial tides to the people they have had to make arrangements 
for their horses, but not so their other rights. "49 With the exception of pasturage, therefore, customary prac-
.. [d. at 620,837 P.2d at 1272. 
42 /d. at 614, 837 P.2d at 1268. See Rod Thompson, Hilojudge rulesfor Hawaiians in land rights case, Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 
January 5, 1996, at A3 (noting that on remand the circuit court judge, in Pele Defense Fund v. Estate of James 
Campbell, issued an oral ruling in favor of the plaintiffs). 
43 2 Haw. at 88. 
H /d . 
• s /d. at 89. See also Kukiiahu v. Gill, 1 Haw. 54, 54(1851); Kekiekiev. Dennis, 1 Haw. 42, 43 (1851). 
46 2 Haw. at 89 . 
., /d. at 90. 
48 [d. (emphasis added). 
'9 Oni v. Meek, No. 788, Supreme Court Proceedings at 13 (October 25, 1858) (available at the Hawai'i State Archives) 
(emphasis added). 
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tices continued without recourse to private agreements even after the government granted fee simple titles. 
The court drew a distinction between Oni's claim of customary right insofar as it was based on his 
status as a fee simple title holder (i.e., kuleana awardee), and the same claim brought according to 
ancient tenure (i.e., as a hoa'aina, maka'ainana, or kanaka). The court suggested that the former cate-
gory of claims is barred, in part, because kuleana awardees were freed from the reciprocal requirement 
of providing labor to the konohiki or to the government, in exchange for the right to use land and its 
appurtenant rights and privileges.5O This rationale fails to address, however, the accepted fact that Oni 
had been providing labor to Haalelea since 1851. In other words, after construing the Haalelea-Meek 
lease reservation restrictively (i.e., as not having incorporated Oni's contract rights), the court based its 
rejection of Oni's purported customary right of pasturage on the existence of an agreement between 
Haalelea and Oni. 
Under this theory, it was not passage of the Kuleana Act but a specific event that aborted the 
development of pasturage as a nascent customary practice in the ahupua'a of Honouliuli. 
Nevertheless, the court indicated that the Haalelea-Meek leases were not affected by the Haalelea-Oni 
agreement which preceded it, because Meek did not have special notice of or bind himself to the lat-
ter's terms.51 The court's acknowledgement that Oni had performed labor for Haalelea over the years 
- "in fulfillment of a private contract" rather than pursuant to custom - is difficult to reconcile with 
its earlier dismissal of the Haalelea-Meek lease reservation as being "of very little practical importance, 
inasmuch as those rights would, as it seems to us, have been equally well preserved without such a 
clause[.]"52 In essence, the court ignored the fact that the lease named a class of third-party beneficia-
ries, including Oni. 
Recalling the court's preliminary admonition that "it was not within the power of the konohiki, 
had he been so disposed, to alienate a single right secured by law to the plaintiff[,] "53 it becomes appar-
ent that the rejection of Oni's claim makes sense only if his rights of pasturage were secured by con-
tract rather than law. Accordingly, just prior to proceeding with the statutory aspect of Oni's claim, 
the court observed that he had "been permitted to enjoy the right of pasturage for his horses, not by force 
rf law or cusWm, but in consideration of certain labor which he '" performed, in accordance with a special 
contract with the konohiki, to that effect, made at a time when the right of pasturage could not have been 
said, with any show of reason, to have become established by ancient custom."54 
Third, and finally, Oni asserted a right of pasturage under the Joint Resolutions on the Subject of 
Rights in Land, which were adopted on November 7, 1846 and never expressly repealed by the 
Legislature. The first Joint Resolution recognized the right of a hoa'aina to "pasture his horse and cow 
and other animals on the land, but not in such numbers as to prevent the konohiki from pasturing his."55 
However, the Oni court held that this law had been "impliedly annulled and superseded by other [subse-
quent] enactments on the same subject."56 
Of particular significance was the Act of August 6, 1850 (Kuleana Act), which protected certain enu-
merated rights of the hoa'aina notwithstanding the grant of allodial title to the konohiki. Relying on 
English common law principles of statutory construction, the court held that "the firstJoint Resolution, of 
November, 1846, has been abrogated, and that the enumeration therein contained, of certain specific rights of 
the hoaaina, apart from his right to the land he cultivated, has been superseded by the specification of the 
50 2 Haw. at 90-91. 
51 !d. at 91. 
52 Compare id. at 90, with id. at 89. 
53 !d. at 89. 
54 !d. at 91 (emphasis added). 
55 !d. at 91 (quoting a part of the first resolution). 
56 !d. at 92. 
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Act of August, 1850[.]"57 In other words, although the list of practices contained in theJoint Resolution 
was superseded by the Kuleana Act, neither act was intended to be an exhaustive accounting of custom-
ary and traditional practices that existed in Hawai'i at that time. 
Thus, what emerges from an understanding of Oni is that the court rejected the plaintiffs claim that 
he had a right to pasture horses, a practice which he believed was entided to protection under the laws of 
the Hawaiian Kingdom. The court did not forever foreclose, however, the viability of future claims 
involving other purported customary and traditional practices. 
4.Explication of prior precedent in Kohanaikil PASH. 
In light of these decisions and the constitutional and statutory provisions on which they rest, it is puz-
zling that the defendants in Kolumailci/ PASH argued that the Planning Commission had no legal obliga-
tion even "to consider, much less require, protection of traditional and customary Hawaiian rights."58 
Accordingly, the Hawai'i Supreme Court responded in part that the CZMA effectively precludes the 
Planning Commission from issuing a SMA permit "unless it finds that the proposed project will not have 
any significant adverse effectsL]" including loss of "any natural or cultural resource," as well as adverse 
impacts on "the economic or social welfare" of the community.59 Because "[t]he interests described by 
PASH [fell] within these broad categoriesLl ... they [were] entided to protection under the CZMA.''60 
The Kohanailci/ PASH court further explained that HRS § 1-1 and Article XII, Section 7 obligate the 
Planning Commission to protect the reasonable exercise of customary rights whether or not they are enu-
merated in HRS § 7-1.61 This conclusion is supported by Kalipi and Pele Difense Fund, both of which 
acknowledged the continued viability of customary rights pursuant to HRS § 1-1, and independent of 
HRS § 7-1. In Kalipi, the court expressly provided that "[t]he precise nature and scope of the rights 
retained by § 1-1 would, of course, depend upon the particular circumstances of each case."62 Moreover, 
Kahpi expressly acknowledged the continued viability of customary practices including "the gathering of 
items not delineated in § 7-1 and the use of defendants' lands for spiritual and other purposes."63 
Thus, Kohanailci/ PASH reaffirmed Kalipi's rejection of one interpretation of the important, mid-
nineteenth century case of Oni v. Meek, supra. Dicta in Oni suggested that unenumerated customary (as 
opposed to statutory) rights had been impliedly abrogated by passage of the Kuleana Act in 1850.64 
For example, the Oni court expressed litde doubt "[t]hat it was the intention of the Legislature to 
declare, in this enactment, all the specific rights of the hoaaina [sic] (except fishing rights) which should 
be held to prevail against the fee simple tide of the konohiki[.]"65 Nevertheless, in resolving this dispute 
over the practice of pasturing horses, the Oni court recognized that this practice was being exercised 
"at a time when the right of pasturage could not have been said, with any show of reason, to have 
become established by ancient custom."66 Accordingly, the Kohanaiki/ PASH court - considering On 
in its entirety - clarified that "Oni merely rejected one particular claim based upon an apparendy non· 
51 !d. at 94-95 (emphasis added). 
58 Kohanaiki/PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 435,903 P.2d at 1256. Less surprising, perhaps, was Nansay's request that the cour 
overrule Pele Defense Fund v. Paty. 
59 !d. at 436, 903 P.2d at 1257. 
60 !d. 
61 !d. at 439-40,903 P.2d at 12(i0-61 (quoting 66 Haw. at 10-11,656 P.2d at 751). 
62 Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 12, 656 P.2d at 752; see al50 Pele Defense Fund, 73 Haw. at 619, 837 P.2d at 1271. 
63 Id. at 10 & n.4, 656 P.2d at 751 & n.4. 
&I Kohanaiki/PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 440-42, 903 P.2d at 1261-63. See al50 Costa v. Flintkote Co., 45 Haw. 518, 51 
(1958) ("repeals by implication are not favored, particularly if effect can be given to both statutes"). 
65 2 Haw. at 95 (emphasis in original). 
66 Id. at 91. 
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traditional practice that had not achieved customary status in the area where the right was asserted."67 
Some legal practitioners have suggested, nevertheless, that the Oni court did in fact intend to resolve 
the status of customary and traditional rights on fee simple lands.58 Presumably, this conclusion is based 
on the first paragraph of the court's opinion, which acknowledges that: 
[t]he defendant agreed that judgment should be entered against him in the Court below, reserving 
by consent his right to appeal, in order that the case, which involves some questions of great 
importance, and will determine the rights of many other persons besides the present plaintiff and 
defendant, might be heard and decided by this Court.69 
In other words, rather than merely recounting the procedural history of the case and summarizing 
Meek's position, this passage supposedly reflects the court's considered judgment regarding the transi-
tion from native Hawaiian land tenure to a system of private property. 
Of course, this language cannot extend the holding of the Oni case beyond the rejection of pas-
turage as a customary right. In fact, the court excluded evidence of pasturing on the same lands by 
another tenant of Honouliuli as "incompetent" based on his self-interest,7o thereby foreclosing any argu-
ment that its ruling had broader import. Even assuming the court's statement was meant to reflect its 
understanding as to the import of this decision, the phrase "other persons" who might be affected by the 
decision could reasonably be limited to other tenants who pastured their horses on lands throughout the 
Hawaiian Islands, without addressing other types of customary and traditional claims. Evidence and 
argument in the case addressed the sometimes differing practices relating to pasturage throughout the 
Kingdom: all the large lands ofO'ahu, Hawai'i, Maui (particularly Hana), Kepaa (presumably Kapa'a, 
Kaua'i), and in Waipi'o.71 There was no substantive discussion of any other customary and traditional 
practices. Therefore, it is unreasonable to infer that the court intended to have any impact on practices 
other than pasturage. 
In a section entitled "The 'other requirements of Kalipt[,]"72 Kohanaikil PASH decisively rejected the 
interpretation that Oni heralded the extinguishment of all customary rights not listed in the Kuleana Act 
of 1850. Moreover, a footnote accompanying the court's quotation of HRS § 1-1 (i.e., the Hawaiian 
usage exception to adoption of the Common Law by the Kingdom of Hawai'i), observes that "an exam-
ination of historical developments suggests that the principles codified in this statute have much earlier 
origins [than 1892]."73 Thejustices noted that the predecessor ofHRS § 1-1 was adopted as part of the 
Act to Reorganize the Judiciary Department. This same enactment repealed sections 14 and 823 of the 
1859 Civil Code, which had established a prohibition against judicial decisions that conflicted with the 
laws and customs of the kingdom and required judges to decide cases equitably - i.e., by making an 
appeal to "received usage."74 
67 Kohanaiki/PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 441,903 P.2d at 1262. 
68 Robert B. (Bruce) Graham,jr., Esq., Presentation to PASH Study Group Meeting (September 5, 1997); see also Paul 
M. Sullivan, Custom in Hawai'i: legal background and constitutional concerns, at 23 (Presented May 30, 1997 at the Hawai'i 
Water Law Seminar, sponsored by the Hawai'i Institute for Continuing Legal Education) (forthcoming 1998, University 
of Hawai'i Law Review). 
69 2 Haw. at 87. 
70 Oni v. Meek, No. 788, Supreme Court Proceedings, Official Minutes at 4-6 (October 25, 1858) (sustaining objection 
to the testimony of Kaope based on the witness's self-interest in establishing a custom at Honouliuli) (available ~t the 
Hawai'i State Archives); see also id., Unofficial Minutes at 2-3 (October 25, 1858). 
71 Oni v. Meek, No. 788, Supreme Court Proceedings, Official Minutes at 10, 13 (October 25, 1858) (the minutes also 
refer to "Kaliikai") (available at the Hawai'i State Archives). 
72 Kohanaiki/PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 440-42,903 P.2d at 1261-63 (subsection IV.B.3.). 
73 /d. at 437 n.21, 903 P.2d at 1258 n.21. 
7. /d. (citing The Civil Code of the Hawaiian Islands ch. III, §§ 14 and 823, at 7 and 195 (1859)). 
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The 1859 Civil Code was prepared pursuant to the third Act of King Kamehameha III, adopted 
on September 7, 1847. This Act empowered the Judiciary to cite and adopt common law principles 
"not in conflict with the laws and usages of this kingdom. "75 The Kohanaikil PASH court further 
acknowledged that the King's first and second Acts had "dramatically restructured Hawaiian society, 
but also retained many cultural elements deemed crucial to the survival of the nation's people."76 For 
example, the Land Commission was obligated to make its decisions regarding interests in land "in 
accordance with principles established by the civil code of this kingdom in regard to ... occupancy, ... 
[and] native usages in regard to landed tenures."77 The Civil Code had not been passed at the time Oni was 
decided. Nevertheless, the Kohanaikil PASH court appears to have been influenced by the fact that the 
guiding principles behind this code, as adopted by King Kamehameha III in his first three acts, were 
indeed binding upon the courts of the Kingdom. 
More important than even the express statutory protection for native usage is the 1839 
Declaration of Rights, which was incorporated in the 1840 Constitution and in effect at the time the 
Kuleana Act was adopted. This document provided that "nothing whatsoever shall be taken from any 
individual except by express provision of the laws."78 Moreover, jurisprudential principles operating in 
the Kingdom provided that it was not "proper to enact laws to enrich the chiefs only, without regard 
to enriching their subjects also, and hereafter there shall by no means be any laws enacted which are at 
variance with what is above expressed.",9 These principles reflected King Kamehameha Ill's attempt 
to deal with chiefs and foreigners who sought to vest land rights without his consent, even though these 
lands were, in fact, revertible to the natives.so (The omission of any reference to the 1840 Constitution 
in Oni v. Meek is striking, to say the least.) In any event, the KOhanaikil PASH court's analysis of Oni is 
consistent with the fundamental principle that, where possible, statutes (e.g., the 1850 Kuleana Act) 
should be interpreted so as to avoid conflicts with constitutional requirements.81 "[W]hen a court con-
strues a statute so as to avoid a difficult constitutional question, it is not making a policy choice; rather 
it is practicing constitutional narrowing."82 
As outlined by the court in Kohanaikil PASH, the development of private property rights at least 
partly reflected an attempt by the Kingdom of Hawai'i to preserve its sovereignty.83 The Kingdom 
never expressed any intention to pursue this goal at the expense of customary rights held by native ten-
ants. Finally, even before Kalipi was decided, the Hawai'i Supreme Court clearly had acknowledged 
that the state's "land laws are unique in that they are based upon ancient tradition, practice and usage."84 
It would have been contrary to the very foundations of jurisprudence for a court to abolish the entire 
75 Id. (citing Act of September 7, 1847, ch. I, § IV; 2 Statute laws Q[ His Mqjes!)l Kamehameha III, King oJthe Hawaiian Islands, 
at 5 (1847)). 
76 /d. 
n /d. at 445 n.33, 903 P.2d at 1266 n.33 (emphasis in original) (quoting the Act of Apri127, 1846, pt. I, ch. VII, art. IV, § 
7). 
78 Thurston, FundmnentallAw oj Hawaii 1 (1904), quoted in Kohanaiki/PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 443, 903 P.2d at 1264. See 
also Kekiekie v. Dennis, 1 Haw. 42, 43 (1851). 
79 Thurston, FundmnentallAw oj Hawaii at 1; see also Maivan C1ech Lam, 17te Kuleana Act Revisited: 17te Survival oj Traditional 
Hawaiian Commoner Rights in Land, 64 WASH. L REV. 227, 268 (1989). 
80 Kohanaiki/PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 443 & n.30, 903 P.2d at 1264 & n.30 (citing Kuykendall, 17te Hawaiian Kingdom 1778-
1854 (1938); 1 Prir!J Council Records 149 (1845-46)). 
81 Cj Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 662 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing DeBartolo Corp. V. Florida Gulf Coast Trades 
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988), for the proposition that "if Congress meant to push the constitutional envelope, it 
must do so explicitly"). 
82 /d. (citing United States V. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d 1285, 1295 n.6 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski,J., dissenting in 
part)). 
83 Kohanaiki/PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 443-46, 903 P.2d at 1264-67. 
8< /d. at 446,903 P.2d at 1267 (citing In re Ashford, 50 Haw. 314, 440 P.2d 76 (1968)) (emphasis added). 
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body of custom and long-established practices of a people in a case detennining whether horses may 
continue to be pastured by an individual tenant in a specific ahupua 'a. 
5.Pai 'Ohana v. United States. 
The Hawai'i Supreme Court's interpretation of Oni presents a sharp contrast with the analysis 
employed by a federal district court in Pai 'Ohana v. United States, supra. That case concerned a dispute 
over five acres of land, including the 'Ai'opio fish trap, located within the ahupua'a of Honokohauiki 
on the island of Hawai'i.85 Because the land falls within the boundaries of the Kaloko-Honokohau 
National Park, the defendant in the case was the United States itself. The park's enabling statute man-
dated that "those families who now occupy leaseholds within the proposed park complex [be allowed] 
to remain on their land for a specific period of time [.]" Claiming undisturbed tenancy from before the 
Mallek, the Pai 'Ohana sought to establish fonnal rights of use and occupancy to their ancestral lands. 86 
Evidence proffered by the plaintiffs in response to a motion for summary judgment before the fed-
eral court showed that the United States' predecessor in interest had recognized and respected the use 
and occupancy rights of the Pai 'Ohana.87 Before the property was sold, the Pais were assured that 
they ''would be able to continue to practice the customs and traditions of [their] ancestors."88 Based 
on these assurances, members of the Pai family signed disclaimers renouncing any rights to the land in 
order to facilitate sale of the property and to avoid a potential confrontation with the Lanihau 
Corporation (a subsidiary of the Greenwell Limited Partnership), which had threatened to commence 
eviction proceedings if they refused to sign the disclaimers.89 
Despite the plaintiffs' efforts to distinguish their rights from the government's rights, the court 
characterized the Pai 'Ohana claim as one for fee simple ownership.90 Mter reviewing the history of 
native Hawaiian land tenure and the transition to a system of private property, the court rejected the 
Pai family's ancestral claims. The Pai 'Ohana opinion embraces the theory, in dicta, that passage of the 
Kuleana Act repealed ancient Hawaiian tenure, leaving only the rights specifically listed in HRS § 7-
1.91 The federal court introduces this theory by citing to the dissenting opinion of Justice Bernard H. 
Levinson in McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson.92 Under Justice Levinson's analysis, however, a separate 
inquiry must be undertaken to detennine whether a particular customary right was retained under 
HRS § 1_1.93 In other words, HRS § 1-1 rights retained their viability notwithstanding passage of the 
'$.uleana Act. The majority in McBryde and the unanimous court, in Reppun v. Board of Water SUpply,94 
essentially agreed with this proposition. Where the majority disagreed with Justice Levinson was in his 
interpretation of Hawaiian usage or custom regarding water, not in the continuing viability of HRS § 
1-1. Thus, the holding of McBryde is at odds with the principle for which it is cited in Pai 'Ohana. 
In addition to the McBryde dissent, Pai 'Ohana relies on four cases decided in the last quarter of the 
85 875 F. Supp. at 682. 
86 Id. at 685. 
81 Declaration of Kelly Greenwell, 1111 2 and 4-6, attached to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion To Dismiss and For Summary Judgment, Pai 'Ohana v. United States, Civ. No. 94-00094 DAE (filed December 
1, 1994). See also Exhibit 8 (oral history of Johnny Rapoza,jr.), attached to this same memorandum. 
88 Declaration of William D. Mahealani Pai" 9, attached to Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
CertifY a Question to the Hawaii Supreme Court, Pai 'Ohana v. United States, Civ. No. 94-00094 DAE (filed December 
8,1994). 
89 !d. 
90 See, e.g., 875 F. Supp. at 685 n.l1 & 690-91. 
91 Id. at 691 (citing Dowsett v. Maukeala, 10 Haw. 166, 170 (1895), and Oni v. Meek, supra). 
92 55 Haw. 260, 286,517 P.2d 26, 41 (1973), eert. denied, 417 U.S. 962 (1974), cited in Pai 'Ohana, 875 F. Supp. at 686. 
93 55 Haw. at 291,517 P.2d at 44. ' 
.. 65 Haw. 531, 539 & 548, 656 P.2d 57,63 & 68 (1982) (reaffirming McBryde exactly nine years later). 
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nineteenth century.95 These cases are not dispositive, however, because they did not involve assertions 
of customary rights per se. Rather, they dealt with claims to fee title by adverse possession and/or 
based on unperfected interests. Prior to the Kohanaiki/ PASH decision, there was no binding precedent 
in this jurisdiction to support the proposition that the reserved rights of native tenants were abrogated 
by passage of the Kuleana Act. Thus, Kohanaiki/ PASH did not overrule any prior, settled body oflaw.96 
The land at issue in Pai 'Ohana was the subject of an 1855 Land Commission award (LCA), which 
expressly provided that the award was issued subject to "the rights of the native tenants within.'197 
Consistent with the Land Commission's Principles and judicial decisions interpreting the applicable 
constitutional provisions,98 the LCA included this reservation notwithstanding the fact that native ten-
ants were barred, after December 30, 1854, from establishing any claims to fee title previously filed 
under the Kuleana Act. 99 Nevertheless, Pai 'Ohana suggested that a Royal Patent award - which sub-
sequently was awarded in 1877 without any reservation favoring the rights of native tenants - had 
somehow extinguished the express reservation in the Land Commission's 1855 grant. lOo As the Pai 
'Ohana decision itself recognizes, however, a Royal Patent merely quit,:;laims the government's propri-
etary interest in a particular parcel ofland and neither confers nor confirms title. IOI Moreover, Articles 
9 and 14 of the 1864 Constitution required due process and reasonable compensation before property 
legally could be taken. In other words, the issuance of a Royal Patent (award or grant) did not affect 
interests in land held by parties other than the government. Royal Patents could not convey away the 
rights of native tenants. Those rights had already been reserved by the King during the original divi-
sion of the land. 
The Pai 'Ohana decision cites Brun,;:; v. Smith l02 for the argument that Land Commission Principles, 
the Kuleana Act, and the Royal Patent process only could be interpreted as having extinguished any 
previously reserved native tenant rights. In particular, the federal court quoted the following language: 
The Commissioners must infer that His majesty intended the utmost liberality to prevail towards 
the claimants, rather against the interests of the body politic, than against those of the claimants' 
It must have been contemplated that the original parcels of land would in no long time be 
subject to division by partition among heirs, and by sales, which for the first time in Hawaiian his-
tory a common man had the power to make, and we can hardly suppose that it was meant that 
95 875 F. Supp. at 690-91 (discussing Dowsett, supra; Thurston v. Bishop, 7 Haw. 421 (1888); Kahoomana v. Minister of 
Interior, 3 Haw. 635 (1875); and Kanoa v. Meek, 6 Haw. 63 (1871)). 
96 Cj Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296-98, 88 S. Ct. 438, 442-43, 19 L. Ed. 530 (1967), cited in 
Kohanaiki/PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 451,903 P.2d at 1272. 
97 875 F. Supp. at 688. See Kohanaiki/PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 440 n.24, 903 P.2d at 1261 n.24 (citing Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 
12,656 P.2d at 752, for the proposition that Territory v. Liliuokalani, 14 Haw. 88, 95 (1902), "does not necessarily dis-
pose of the 'kuleana' reservation as a source of additional gathering rights beyond HRS § 7-1 "). 
98 See Lam, supra note 79, at 267-82. 
99 Act of July 20, 1854 (An Act to Provide for the Dissolution of the Board of Commissioners to Q.tiet Land Titles). 
Even after the Land Commission was dissolved in March 1855, the Minister of the Interior included reservations of 
native tenant rights in Royal Patent awards to konohiki claimants - see, e.g., Jon J. Chinen, ORIGINAL LAND 
TITLES IN HAWAII 14-15 (2d ed. 1971) (reprinting Royal Patent 4475 to Kamamalu, dated April 3, 1861); Paul F. 
Nahoa Lucas, A DICTIONARY OF HAWAIIAN LEGAL LAND-TERMS 134 (1995) (reprinting Patent 4472 to 
Kamanoualanai, dated February 27, 1861) - and in sales of government lands. See, e.g., Royal Patent (Grant) 1965 to 
Mokuhia, dated February 25, 1856 (on file with the authors); Royal Patent (Grant) 1969 to Francis Davis, dated 
February 25, 1856 (on fIle with the authors). 
100 875 F. Supp. at 689. 
lOt /d. at 687, 690. See also Brunz v. Smith, 3 Haw. 783, 787-88 (1877); Mist v. Kawelo, II Haw. 587, 589 (1898). 
102 3 Haw. 783 (1877), cited in 875 F. Supp. at 689-90. 
VOL. I NO. 13 NATIVE HAWAIIAN CULTURAL PRACTICES UNDER THREAT 15 
the right· to acquire complete tide should depend in its exercise upon the concurrence of other 
owners in the same tract, a condition which would often practically destroy the right. 103 
Focusing on the presumed purpose of the Land Commission to make the original grants permanent 
and absolute to the exclusion of other claims, the Pai 'Ohana decision suggests that: 
It would be inconsistent with the stated purpose of the Kuleana Act and the Principles themselves 
to suppose that the land was to be given in fee simple to the holder of the Royal Patent yet always 
subject to the continued exclusive tenancy or occupancy of whomever was upon the land at the time 
of the Great [Mahele]. This is particularly true because the rights of the native tenants were 
expressly addressed by the Kuleana Act, the purpose of which was to resolve and legally define 
these native tenants' interests. Any other interpretation would render both the Land Commission, 
the Kuleana Act, and the Patent Award process of the Hawaiian Kingdom a futile and nonsensi-
cal exercise. 1M 
The federal court's rationale not only merges - and thereby loses - the unique historical differ-
ence between occupancy and non-exclusive rights in land, but further distorts the context of the dis-
pute in Brunz. The plaintiff in that case had applied to the Minister of Interior for a Royal Patent, 
seeking to confirm part of a previous Land Commission Award upon payment of a proportional com-
mutation fee. The sole issue before the court was whether the Minister was authorized to issue a par-
tial patent or whether he could only issue a patent for an entire parcel. 105 Applying a liberal construc-
tion to the relevant statute, which did not expressly prohibit patents for portions of a land award, the 
court answered that partial patent awards were allowed, explaining that: 
Patents based on awards do not ... confer or confirm tides. . .. The tide of every holder or part 
holder is left to be derived from the "person to whom the original award was made." The new 
grant from the government of fee simple goes back to the date of the award and attaches to the 
subsequent transfers .... [I]he effect of the patent is to relinquish the government's interest ... it 
grants nothing to subsequent holders, other than as they derive through the first, and such patents 
are entirely inconclusive as to rights between part holders. I06 
Nevertheless, the court held that the claimant in Brunz was not entided to a patent award under the 
facts of the case - viz., the proffered description of the land did not clearly fall with the boundaries of 
the original award. l07 This case does not stand for the proposition that the rights of native tenants can 
be extinguished without their consent. 
Given this background, it is clear that the Pai 'Ohana court's analysis of the development of proper-
ty law in Hawai'i fails to incorporate the distinction between customary practices and tenancy, which 
was addressed by the Hawai'i Supreme Court in Kohanaikil PASH.I08 Moreover, Pai 'Ohana runs 
counter to a fundamental principle of private property that recognizes the right of a person who holds 
103 /d. at 786-87, cited in 875 F. Supp. at 689-90. 
104 875 F. Supp. at 690 (emphasis added). 
10.; 3 Haw. at 785. 
106 /d. at 787-88. 
101 /d. at 788-89. 
108 79 Hawai'i at 442 n.29, 903 P.2d at 1263 n.29 (observing that the claims in Kalipi and Oni considered "tenancy" for 
the purpose of determining standing rather than ascertaining substantive rights); see also id. at 441 n.27, 903 P.2d at 1262 
n.27 (observing that "it is possible to construe the term 'tenant' so as to incorporate the traditional native Hawaiian con-
cept of a cultural link to the land"). 
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an easement or profit to exclude third parties from interfering with his or her use of the landowner's 
property.l09 In any event, it is well-setded that federal courts are bound to apply background principles 
of property law as defined by the individual states. IIO 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial judge's opinion after 
considering additional briefing and arguments on the effect of Kohanaikil PASH on his analysis. The 
panel decided that Kohanaikil PASH did not require reversal of the district court's analysis, noting that 
the Hawai'i Supreme Court's decision did not involve a claim to exclusive use and occupancy.lll 
Demonstrating an apparent failure to grasp the distinction between the nature and scope of rights pro-
tected under HRS § 1-1 versus § 7-1, the Ninth Circuit panel cited HRS § 7-1 in ruling that 
Kohanaikil PASH could not support the proposition that use and occupation of land according to 
ancient custom is accorded legal protection under Hawai'i common law. ll2 
A reasonable argument could be made that this oversight was cured by the Ninth Circuit's subse-
quent citation to dicta in Hawaiian Housing Authoriry v. Lyman,113 suggesting that the "Hawaiian usage" 
clause in HRS § 1-1 does not support the proposition that native tenants possess exclusive use and occu-
pancy rights over kuleana lands they failed to claim, in part, because their tenancy was "subject always 
to dispossession and redivision."1l4 In other words, although Pele Defense Fund and Kohanaikil PASH ordi-
narily provide the opportunity to establish customary Hawaiian rights beyond those enumerated in 
HRS § 7-1, "[a]ncient custom did not include the right to remain upon and exclude others from the 
land."ll5 Therefore, inasmuch as the Pai 'Ohana claimed rights of exclusive use and occupancy,ll6 they 
arguably could not prevail under Hawai'i law. 
As recognized by the Hawai'i Supreme Court in Kohanaikil PASH, persons seeking customary 
access must "alwqys respect the private areas of other tenants."117 However, it is possible that a localized 
custom may have evolved by 1892 on a particular parcel - as an adjustment to the merging of 
ancient Hawaiian and western private property principles - which accorded the right of exclusive use 
and occupancy under certain circumstances. For example, it was understood that the families who 
lived at 'Ai'opio were on the land when it was acquired by the Greenwel1s and it was long agreed that 
"they could continue to live there as long as they did not abuse the land."118 The Greenwells never 
demanded rent from these families, but some of the families would provide gifts, including fish and 
pork, particularly around Christmas. 119 A custom recognizing exclusive use and occupancy might also 
make sense where necessary to preserve valuable historic and cultural sites or to conserve vulnerable 
natural resources. Thus, it is conceivable that a localized custom evolved which provided authority for 
109 Cunningham, Stoebuck & Whitman, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.1, at 436 (1984); see also id. § 6.22, at 282 (pro-
viding that a tenant may exclude third parties and, with few exceptions, the landlord as well). 
110 See, e.g., Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 295, 88 S. Ct. 438, 19 L. Ed. 530 (1967) (Stewart,]., concurring). 
III 76 F.3d 280 (9th Cir. 1996); THE RECORDER, Feb. 5,1996, at 746. 
112 76 F.3d at 282. 
113 68 Haw. 55, 63 n.3, 704 P.2d 888,892 n.3 (1985), cited in Pai 'Ohana, 76 F.3d at 282. Like the cases cited in the dis-
trict court opinion, Lyman did not involve the assertion of any customary rights. 
114 Lyman, 68 Haw. at 63 n.3, 704 P.2d at 892 n.3. 
115 76 F.3d at 282 (citing Reppun, 656 P.2d at 68). 
116 875 F. Supp. at 693 (noting "the fact that the Pai 'Ohana has not only erected barricades and refused Park visitors 
and employees entrance to the area, but has stated that its right to 'Ai'opio is exclusive"). 
117 Kohanaiki/PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 439 n.23, 903 P.2d at 1260 n.23 (emphasis in original). Contra Lyng v. Northwest 
Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (observing that the exclusion of all uses other than traditional and cus-
tomary practices is unreasonable), cited in Kohanaiki/PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 447 n.38, 903 P.2d at 1268 n.38. 
118 Declaration of Kelly Greenwell, ~ 6, attached to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion To 
Dismiss and For Summary Judgment, Pai 'Ohana v. United States, Civ. No. 94-00094 DAE (filed December 1, 1994). 
119 /d., ~ 5. 
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tenants to exclude others in accordance with applicable cultural protocols. 
In light of the foregoing, the Ninth Circuit should have reversed the District Court's decision and certified 
to the Hawai'i Supreme Court the following question posed by the Pai 'Ohana: 
Assuming continuity of use and occupation, since before the [Mahele], of an undeveloped portion 
of an ahupua 'a in which the rights of native tenants within were reserved by the Land 
Commission, does a native tenant whose ancestors did not apply for a kuleana retain rights of use 
and [occupancy] to the land?'20 
The Hawai'i Supreme Court could have then reviewed the evidence, intexpreted its own precedent, and made 
a clear determination of the property law that applies in this State. 
C.Tbe~~of~nunodadonandCoop~don 
Returning to the issue of legislative reactions to KohmuziJd/ PASH, it is important to remember that the liti-
gation leading to that decision began only after a break down in preliminary discussions between Nansay and 
the community group known as PASH. The developer obstinately opposed PASH's attempt to intervene in a 
contested case hearing on the application for a SMA use permit. Nansay then convinced the Hawai'i County 
Planning Commission that PASH members' claimed interests were not "clearly distinguishable from that of 
the general public" under the agency's rules. As a result, native Hawaiians whose parents and grandparents 
had gathered on that particular property were effectively denied participation in the planning process. Nine 
out of nine judges who reviewed the casel21 agreed that the Planning Commission's action was unjustified. 122 
In addressing the dispute between the parties, the Hawai'i Supreme Court emphasized the necessity and 
importance of obtaining cooperation between landowners, developers and the practitioners of protected tradi-
tional and customary rights. The court's reasoning is particularly important in the context of an economy 
heavily dependent on the tourist trade: 
There should be little difficulty accommodating the customary and traditional Hawaiian rights 
asserted in the instant case with Nansay's avowed puxposes. A community development propos-
ing to integrate cultural education and recreation with tourism and community living represents a 
promising opportunity to demonstrate the continued viability of Hawaiian land tenure ideals in 
the modem world. '23 
Difficulties arise only when a practitioner engages in unreasonable or non-traditional uses, or when other inter-
ested parties are unwilling to recognize and accommodate legitimate traditional and customary rights. 
Nevertheless, "the non-confrontational aspects of traditional Hawaiian culture should minimize potential dis-
turbances."'24 This does not mean that there will be no cases in which a claimant asserts rights without 
120 875 F. Supp. at 700. 
121 As reflected in the decision of Third Circuit Court Judge Ronald Ibarra and the unanimous opinions of the 
Intermediate Court of Appeals (Burns, CJ., Heen and Watanabe, JJ.) and the Supreme Court (Moon, CJ., Klein, 
Levinson, Nakayama and Ramil,JJ.). See note 1 supra (citing these decisions). 
122 Although a condition attached to the permit issued by the HPC would have required protection of the anchialine 
ponds where native Hawaiians gathered 'opae (shrimp), it did not protect traditional and customary gathering activities. 
See Kohanaiki/PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 246, 900 P.2d at 1321. 
123 Id. at 447, 903 P.2d 1268. See also, e.g., Stu Glauberman, An input qf Hawaiiana, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, 
September 16, 1996, at Cl ("No planning document is complete without an analysis of Hawaiian archaeology, history 
and cultural impacts."); Glauberman, Former activists gWen credit, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, September 16, 1996, at 
C 1 (" [B] usinesses need to be more familiar with Hawaiian practices and culture, and sensitivities. "). 
124 Kohanaiki/PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 447,903 P.2d at 1268 (citation ~mitted). 
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any basis in custom,125 or that such persons might exercise valid rights unreasonably. Rather, the 
Hawai'i Supreme Court appeared to stress the generally accommodating nature of native Hawaiian 
practitioners; provided, of course, that reasonable accommodation of their traditions is not withheld. 
Neither of the 1997 legislative proposals reflect these principles of accommodation and coopera-
tion. Instead, SB 8 and HB 1920 are reminiscent of the position taken by Nansay in one of its briefs to 
the Hawai'i Supreme Court: "When the owner develops land, the gathering rights disappear."126 
Nansay's overzealous attempt to extinguish traditional and customary rights is particularly perplexing 
given the preservation of public access to its resort complex - the public would have been welcome 
and, indeed, invited to the site. The position adopted by the developer in litigation is even more puz-
zling in light of the its purported goal of integrating cultural education and recreation with tourism. 
At least temporarily, however, reason has prevailed. Mter holding a hearing on HB 1920 during 
the 1997 legislative session, House Hawaiian Affairs Committee Chair Edward E. (Ed) Case indefinite-
ly deferred action on the bill. Almost two weeks later, in the wake of a twenty-four hour vigil by 
'Ilio'ulaokalani (a coalition of native Hawaiians concerned about the threat to their culture), the Senate 
suspended consideration of SB 8. 127 However, the co-chair of the Senate Committee on Land, Water 
and Hawaiian Affairs, Senator A. Leiomalama Solomon, observed that this "doesn't mean the prob-
lems or questions are going away . . .. As it affects (property) titles, I think it is real and has to be 
addressed."128 Representative Case also has identified "PASH-related issues ... as one of [the legisla-
ture's] top priorities in the 1998 session."129 
With landowners, developers, and title insurers all clamoring for a higher degree of "certainty" 
regarding legitimate traditional and customary practices, it is ironic that their allegations of 
Koha:naikil PASH-related financing problems have largely been accepted at face value. One such claim 
was made during the hearing on SB 8 by a representative of the Hawaii Association of Realtors,who 
suggested that problems of title insurance and financing related to the Kohanaikil PASH decision forced 
Nansay to abandon its project. Senator Solomon, who represents that area on the Big Island of 
Hawai'i, rejected this unfounded assertion, pointing out the well known fact that Nansay had signifi-
cant financial problems independent of the court's decision. In any event, bankers and other represen-
tatives of lending institutions, whose participation is necessary for an informed consideration of the 
issues, were noticeably absent from the legislative hearings on these bills. 
The sensitive nature of financial information may explain possible reluctance to provide such 
information as a matter of public record. Yet, by the same token, it is conceivable that disclosure of 
traditional and customary practices as required under SB 8 and HB 1920 would be unwise (from a 
resource conservation perspective), in violation of customary practices as passed down to current prac-
titioners by their ancestors and others, or even an affront to the intensely personal nature of a particu-
125 According to Carl C. Christensen, Esq., if such cases do occur, a significant portion of the blame can properly be 
attributed to press coverage quoting opponents of the Kohanaiki/PASH decision, who described the court's holding in 
extraordinarily broad terms. See, e.g., note lO, supra. 
126 Kohanaiki/PASH, No. 15460, Second Supplemental Brief (Opening Brie:!) of Petitioner-Appellee-Appellant Nansay 
Hawaii, Inc. (flled August 27, 1993) at 19. 
127 Greg Barrett, Land issue stirs new activism, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, March 6, 1997, at Bl, B4 (quoting Senator 
Solomon). 
128 /d. 
129 Letter from Representative Ed Case to Rick Egged, Director, Office of Planning, Department of Business, Economic 
Development and Tourism (May 28, 1997) (on flle with the authors). 
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lar exercise. l30 
A fair resolution of the perceived conflict between landowners and practitioners will, therefore, 
require a critical inquiry into the rationale for institutional decisions to deny financing based on poten-
tial traditional and customary rights claims. Provisions comparable to the following "PASH 
Exception" have begun to appear in the coverage provided under Hawai'i title insurance policies: 
Claims arising out of customary and traditional rights and practices, including without limitation 
those exercised for subsistence, cultural, religious, access or gathering purposes, as provided for in 
the Hawaii Constitution or the Hawaii Revised States. 131 
Title companies purportedly have crafted this exception to protect themselves from uncer~ainty 
regarding the nature and scope of traditional and customary rights. It is unclear, however, whether 
these exceptions are absolutely necessary.132 For example, the court in Kukiiahu, supra, did not express 
concern that acquisition ofland subject to the rights of natives would in any way undermine the "secu-
rity for any man's real estate" or "rest for his title."133 
The insistence on utilizing this exception, therefore, appears to reflect a mistaken belief that the 
Kohanaikil PASH decision created new rights. That is not to say that Kohanaikil PASH provided all the 
answers regarding customary and traditional rights. In fact, the court reiterated that "[t]he precise 
nature and scope of the rights retained by § 1-1 ... depend upon the particular circumstances of each 
case."I34 Accordingly, legislative action may be an appropriate alternative to further judicial clarifica-
tion regarding the precise nature and scope of traditional and customary rights protected by HRS § I-
I and article XII, section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution. Any attempt to clarifY these rights through 
legislation must, however, conform to constitutional requirements. In any event, once rhetoric and 
reality have been reconciled, it should be possible to find some common ground.135 
D. Conclusion 
Faced with a dispute over the development of a major tourist resort on the island of Hawai'i, the 
Kohanaikil PASH court simply declared, as mandated by explicit statutory and constitutional provisions, 
130 See, e.g., Paul F. Nahoa Lucas, Don't Blame PASH, in KA WAI OLA 0 OHA, vol. 14, number 10 'Okakopa (October) 
1997, at 11 (observing that "probing questions by government officials or private landowners to dissect the nature of the 
practice is considered maha'oi or rude"). 
131 Facsimile transmission from Valerie Tanaka, Title Guaranty Escrow Services, Inc., to David M. Forman dated 
October 22, 1997 (on me with the authors). 
132 See, e.g., Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Nansay Hawaii, Inc., Civ. No. 96-00087 (D. Haw. medJan. 25, 1996) (seeking a 
declaratory judgment that, inter alia, Nansay has not and will not suffer any loss or damage under or pursuant to its title 
insurance policy as a result of customary or traditional rights). This complaint subsequently was dismissed by stipulation 
of the parties. Id., Stipulation and Order For Dismissal of All Claims Against All Parties and For Retention of 
Jurisdiction to Enforce Settlement Agreement (Jan. 30, 1997) (dismissing with prejudice claims that the title policy oblig-
ates Chicago Title to defend Nansay and dismissing without prejudice claims that Nansay is entitled to indemnification 
under the policy). The arguments raised in the original complaint and in subsequent pleadings deserve further scrutiny, 
but are beyond the scope of this article. 
133 1 Haw. at 91. Carl C. Christensen, Esq., argues that the perceived economic impact of Kolumaikil PASH and over-
broad claims of customary and traditional rights represent a "self-made crisis." See, e.g., notes 10 and 125, supra. 
134 Kohanaiki/PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 438,440,903 P.2d at 1259, 1261 (citations omitted). 
135 Hse. Res. No. 197 (1997) requests the Department of Business Economic Development and Tourism's Office of 
Planning to "facilitate discussions among all interested parties ... with the goal of reaching consensus ... [and] to submit 
a final report to the legislature twenty days prior to the convening of the Regular Session of 1998, identil)ring with speci-
ficity the process undertaken, the areas of consensus, and, with respect to the remaining issues, the policy options for con-
sideration by the Legislature[.]" 
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that legitimate traditional and customary practices must be considered as part of the planning process. 
In accordance with the "Aloha Spirit,"136 which supposedly distinguishes our state and its people from 
others, Kohanaikil PASH calls for the accommodation of customary and traditional practices with eco-
nomic development. The uncertainty in the general community concerning the nature of these prac-
tices is not an insurmountable obstacle to the planning process; methodologies do, in fact, exist that 
can help document traditional and customary practices in particular areas. 137 
Although customary rights need only be protected where it is feasible to do so, "the State does not 
have the urifettered discretion to regulate the rights of ahupua'a tenants out of existence."llS Thus, the 
constitutionality of any effort to restrict traditional and customary rights depends on whether or not 
reasonable alternatives are available. But as the facts of Kohanaikil PASH well illustrate, in the absence 
of a legal framework to level the playing field, the native Hawaiian culture faces a real threat of piece-
meal extinction. 
Kohanaikil PASH is an important decision for all Hawai'i residents, particularly to the extent that it 
highlighted the State's obligations regarding native Hawaiian rights. The Hawai'i Supreme Court 
synthesized and reaffirmed precedent recognizing longstanding legal protection for traditional and cus-
tomary cultural practices. Notwithstanding the guidelines provided by the court to promote further 
deliberations on remand,139 it is obvious that the precise nature and scope of the rights protected by 
HRS § 1-1 and the Constitution of the State of Hawai'i deserves fuller examination. However, the 
decision categorically rejects the argument made by property owners that native Hawaiian cultural 
practices are "dangerous anachronisms" in the modern world which threaten "the concept of fee sim-
ple ownership in Hawaii."I-Hl The court's open-minded approach to these admittedly difficult and 
complicated questions should be a model for those legislators who care to maintain the unique legal 
and political entity that is the State ofHawai'i. 
136 See HRS §§ 5-7.5(a) & (b) (1993), quoted in PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 450 n.44, 903 P.2d at 1271 n.44. 
131 See, e.g., McGregor, Matsuoka & Minerbi, Native Hawaiian Ethnographic Stwfy for Hawai'i Geothermal Prqject Proposed for 
Puna and Southeast Maui (May 1996); Davianna Pomaka'i McGregor, An "Introduction to the Hoa'aina and Their Rights," 
in THE HAWAIIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY, vol. 30, at 1-27 (1996). 
136 Kohanaiki/PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 451, 903 P.2d at 1272 (emphasis added). 
139 After the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, the proceedings terminated when Nansay withdrew its per-
mit application before the Hawai'i County Planning Commission on or about August 1, 1996. Hugh Clark, Builder with-
draws its Kona resort application, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, August 2, 1996, at A5 (indicating that the developer stated 
that it could revive the stalled project if it regains its financing fromJapan). 
14() See Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 4,656 P.2d at 747. 
